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Electoral volatility is thought to reflect the level of a party 
system’s stability and is, therefore, a prominent topic in the 
comparative politics literature. Significant discord and gaps, 
however, remain in the literature. For example, the study of 
the relationship between economic factors and electoral vol-
atility in Latin America extends back decades, and yet no 
consensus has emerged on the economic factors that drive 
electoral volatility or whether economic factors play any role 
at all (compare Remmer (1991), Roberts and Wibbels (1999), 
and Cohen et al. (2018)). Perhaps more important, there has 
been little attention given to the role of economic adjust-
ment. Recent scholarship has pointed to the importance of 
studying economic factors that gain salience in particular 
contexts, including structural adjustment policies associated 
with lending by the international creditors during periods of 
economic distress (Frieden & Walter, 2017; Kuenzi et al., 
2019). In Latin America, International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
structural adjustment policies that followed severe debt or 
currency crises have been highly salient (and controversial), 
and studies have linked them to citizens’ political behavior in 
the region (Ortiz & Béjar, 2013). Nevertheless, to date, no 
study has provided a quantitative analysis of the effects of 
structural adjustment on electoral volatility in Latin America.
An additional limitation of the prior literature concerns 
the measure of volatility employed in most analyses. Many 
analysts tend to focus on overall volatility. This has been 
captured with “Pedersen’s index of electoral volatility, which 
measures the net change in the seat (or vote) shares of all 
parties from one election to the next” (Mainwaring & Scully, 
1995, p. 6). To be sure, a few scholars have disaggregated 
electoral volatility into two types (e.g., Mainwaring et al., 
2017; Powell & Tucker, 2014; Weghorst & Bernhard, 2014). 
Extra-system volatility (or Type-A volatility) is created by 
“the entry and exit of parties from the political system” while 
within-system volatility (or Type-B volatility) “occurs when 
voters switch their votes between existing parties” (Powell & 
Tucker, 2014, p. 124). (Some scholars, such as Powell and 
Tucker (2014) and Weghorst and Bernhard (2014), use the 
terms “Type-A volatility” and “Type-B volatility.” We have 
adopted Mainwaring et al.’s (2017) phraseology of “within-
system volatility” and “extra-system volatility.”) Still, the 
few studies that have disaggregated electoral volatility have 
neglected the possible role of structural adjustment, while 
their analyses of economic influences has been limited in 
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certain respects. With regard to Latin America, only the 
study by Cohen et al. (2018) has disaggregated electoral vol-
atility and attempted to identify the economic factors associ-
ated with within-system volatility and extra-system volatility 
in the region. However, as Cohen et al.’s (2018) purpose was 
to introduce their new volatility data set (Latin American 
Presidential and Legislative Elections [LAPALE]), their 
study was limited to an examination of only inflation, growth, 
and nominal exchange rates; importantly, they did not study 
the role of structural adjustment or model other standard 
institutional or demographic influences. They suggest that 
future scholars using the LAPALE data set will need to pro-
vide a comprehensive analysis of the various economic, 
institutional, and demographic factors associated with differ-
ent types of volatility.
As one step in filling these gaps in the literature, this study 
examines the effects of structural adjustment on electoral 
volatility in Latin America, while controlling for other stan-
dard economic, institutional, and sociodemographic influ-
ences. We also seek to improve our understanding of the 
topic by examining within-system, extra-system, and total 
volatility. Drawing upon the LAPALE database (http://www.
lapaledata.com) and our own original data set for structural 
adjustment, we focus on legislative volatility in 18 Latin 
American countries during the period of 1982 to 2016. (See 
Table A2 in the Appendix for the countries in the sample and 
the number of observed elections per country.)
This study finds support for a broad version of economic 
voting theory. Consistent with theoretical expectations, we 
find that structural adjustment heightens within-system vola-
tility, which suggests that voters who bear the short-term 
costs of reform switch to other established opposition parties, 
thereby punishing governing parties who consent to IMF 
conditionality. After accounting for the role of adjustment, 
our results indicate that economic growth does not exhibit a 
significant influence on legislative volatility in the Latin 
American countries examined in this study. Beyond adjust-
ment, extra-system volatility appears to be driven primarily 
by institutional arrangements and social demography.
This study addresses a topic of great scholarly and real-
world importance. Despite the prevalence of structural 
adjustment and the depth of adjustment’s effects, the politi-
cal implications of structural adjustment are still not fully 
understood. A quick search in Google Scholar reveals that 
thousands of scholarly works have been written on struc-
tural adjustment in Latin America. To our knowledge, none 
of these works has offered a quantitative examination of the 
relationship between structural adjustment and electoral 
volatility, a key indicator of party system institutionaliza-
tion. According to the scholarly literature, party system 
institutionalization is integrally linked to regime stability, 
sound policymaking, and the quality of democracy, all of 
which in turn help determine people’s quality of life (e.g., 
see Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007; 
Robbins, 2010; Rose & Mishler, 2010, p. 802).
Moreover, this is the only study that, to date, examines the 
effects of social demography and political institutions on the 
different types of volatility in Latin America. As we can see 
in the results of our study, disaggregating volatility into 
extra-system volatility and within-system volatility is impor-
tant, as they appear to be driven by different variables or in 
opposite ways by the same variables. As Kuenzi et al. (2019) 
note in their study of Africa, extra-system volatility has been 
on the rise, while Andrews and Bairett (2014) find that extra-
system volatility constitutes more of total volatility in Central 
and Eastern Europe than does within-system volatility. (In 
contrast, Weghorst and Bernhard (2014) and Powell and 
Tucker (2014) find that this type of volatility is declining in 
Africa and post-Communist Europe, respectively.) In Latin 
America, Cohen et al. (2018, Figure 1) also provide evidence 
that extra-system volatility accounts for a larger share of 
overall volatility than within-system volatility. These trends 
pose profound challenges for democratic governance. 
Although scholars have tended to view within-system vola-
tility as playing a wholesome role in democratic systems, 
Powell and Tucker (2014, p. 124) note that party system 
instability is most strongly linked to extra-system volatility, 
a type of volatility that creates some unique difficulties for 
democracy and macroeconomic stability. For these reasons, 
there remains an ongoing need to study the forces that give 
rise to electoral volatility.
Literature Review and Theory
Economic Performance
Many studies have examined the potential influence of eco-
nomic factors on electoral volatility. The notion that eco-
nomic factors influence electoral volatility rests on the idea 
that citizens’ voting behavior is shaped by the performance 
of the economy. According to economic voting theory, voters 
will reward incumbents with their votes for positive eco-
nomic performance, while punishing them for negative per-
formance by redirecting their electoral support to another 
party or candidate. Economic voting theory, which has been 
the subject of hundreds of studies, has found strong empiri-
cal support (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000).
Some scholars have contended, however, that the support 
for the notion that economic performance influences elec-
toral volatility is mixed (e.g., Bernhard & Karakoc, 2011; 
Cohen et al., 2018; Nadeau et al., 2017, p. 99). In the context 
of Latin America, Cohen et al. (2018) note that their results 
for the period from 1980 to 1990 support those of Remmer 
(1991) and Roberts and Wibbels (1999) who find that eco-
nomic variables influence electoral volatility in Latin 
American countries. According to Cohen et al. (2018), 
however, these results are not stable across time and one 
sees no such relationships between legislative volatility and 
these economic variables in the period from 1978 to 2016. 
Hernández and Kriesi (2016) find that the “Great Recession” 
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had relatively weak effects on party stability in Central and 
Eastern Europe “where political rather than economic fail-
ures appeared to be more relevant” (203). In contrast, they 
find that this recession played a significant role in under-
mining the stability of party systems in Western Europe 
(203). Ferree (2010) concludes that economic factors do not 
play a role in electoral volatility in African countries.
Perhaps these disparate claims emanate from the fact 
that most of the studies of economic voting focus on the 
advanced industrialized democracies, particularly the 
United States. The studies of emerging democracies are 
much less numerous. Although Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 
(2008, p. 320) conclude that, overall, economic voting 
theory is supported by the studies of transitional democra-
cies, they note that many questions on this topic are still 
unanswered. For example, the economic variables likely to 
be at play are not clear. Scholars such as Bernhard and 
Karakoc (2011) have also raised the point that traditional 
indicators of economic performance such as gross domes-
tic product (GDP) growth may not have the same effects 
on voting behavior in different contexts. Indeed, Bernhard 
and Karakoc (2011) find that inequality, which is a post-
authoritarian phenomenon in the post-Communist coun-
tries, influences electoral volatility while economic growth 
does not. Like Bernhard and Karakoc (2011), Kuenzi et al. 
(2019) identify indicators outside of those most commonly 
used to examine the relationship between economic factors 
and volatility in Africa. Kuenzi et al. (2019) test the effects 
of two international political economy variables, donor aid 
and IMF structural adjustment programs, which have been 
salient in African countries but have not otherwise been 
tested in the literature. They find that aid and structural 
adjustment do indeed have significant effects on electoral 
volatility in Africa. Aid tends to lessen volatility while 
adjustment tends to boost it.
Structural Adjustment
Some of the dynamics surrounding structural adjustment in 
Africa are shared by Latin American countries. In particular, 
structural adjustment has been unpopular with the publics of 
most African and Latin American countries. As required by 
the IMF, structural adjustment agreements generally obligate 
governments to privatize state-owned industries, reduce the 
number of public sector employees, cut social spending, 
deregulate, and eliminate subsidies and price controls 
(Tuman, 2000). Adjustment policies impose costs on citizens 
in the short to medium term, but they are intended to lead to 
a more sustainable economic environment in the future. To 
be sure, adjustment has been both extremely salient and 
unpopular in Latin America (Almeida, 2007), and the simi-
larities in the public’s reaction to structural adjustment in 
Latin American countries and African countries are striking. 
As noted, although many other economic variables have 
been examined previously, no one has empirically tested the 
effects of structural adjustment on electoral volatility in the 
Latin American context.
The effects of structural adjustment operate through two 
key mechanisms. First, as noted by Ortiz and Béjar (2013), 
structural adjustment increases contentious collective action 
in Latin America partly because people doubt the legitimacy 
of a government that cedes control over economic policy to 
an international organization (492). Similarly, Bratton and 
van de Walle (1997), who link structural adjustment to politi-
cal protest in Africa, attribute the unpopularity of structural 
adjustment in Africa to the loss of legitimacy incurred by 
governments who compromise national sovereignty and 
enter into adjustment agreements with the IMF, an interna-
tional organization that is perceived to be dominated by the 
United States (i.e., the “Washington Consensus”). Kuenzi 
et al. (2019) argue that it is governments’ appearance of 
weakness and loss of legitimacy under adjustment that 
explains the positive effect of structural adjustment on elec-
toral volatility. Given the effects of structural adjustment on 
protest in Latin America, it would seem likely to affect other 
types of political behavior such as voting. Thus, we would 
expect structural adjustment to have a similar effect on elec-
toral volatility in Latin America. Previous government sup-
porters are likely to abandon the ruling party at the polls after 
the government agrees to structural adjustment and give their 
vote to another party which will give rise to electoral volatil-
ity. If established opposition parties have a track record of 
resisting IMF loans, then they may reap the benefits of vot-
ers’ dissatisfaction with governing parties over adjustment.
The second mechanism concerns the effects of adjustment 
on resources that are key to political patronage. Our logic is 
similar to that spelled out by Kuenzi et al. (2019). The eco-
nomic reforms prescribed by the IMF may weaken the state’s 
control over employment, subsidies, and spending which is 
likely to lead to a loss of support for the ruling party. Greene 
(2010) argues that it is the control of state resources that 
allows dominant parties to stay in power because these 
resources can be used in a multitude of ways to bolster the 
position of the ruling party, such as for patronage or election 
campaigns (Greene, 2010, pp. 811–812). Therefore, these 
economic reforms make it more difficult for the ruling party 
to reward their clients and diminish the advantage it previ-
ously had in campaigning. We would therefore expect these 
reforms to encourage voters to switch their support from the 
incumbent party to another party.
We argue that the context influences whether voters 
unhappy with the ruling party for acquiescing to structural 
adjustment will turn to new parties or established opposition 
parties. More specifically, we argue that in contrast to other 
regions, such as Africa, Latin America comprises numerous 
countries that have had established opposition parties that 
could represent the antistructural adjustment stances of their 
citizens. We argue that the supply of parties in a country 
influences whether voters punish ruling parties for poor 
performance by transferring their support to established 
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opposition parties or new parties. This argument is consis-
tent to those of other authors such as Benton (2005) who 
contends that how citizens dissatisfied with the incumbent 
party reallocate their votes depends on whether small or new 
parties have been able to enter the political system. Although 
Kuenzi et al. (2019) find that structural adjustment increases 
legislative volatility primarily through extra-system volatil-
ity in African countries, we hypothesize that structural 
adjustment will increase legislative volatility primarily 
through within-system volatility in the context of Latin 
America. Although surveys have shown varying levels of 
confidence in political parties, established opposition par-
ties in Latin America have provided a more viable alterna-
tive for those angry about their government entering into 
structural adjustment agreements with the IMF than have 
established opposition parties in Africa. In contrast to the 
situation in African countries, existing opposition parties 
had established themselves as being anti-adjustment in a 
number of Latin American countries. For example, existing 
prominent leftist parties were able to represent citizens’ 
anti-adjustment sentiments in countries such as Brazil, 
Chile, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Uruguay 
(Roberts, 2013, p. 1436). Even though adjustment fostered 
notable instability in Argentina’s party system, it was one 
faction of the Peronist party that ultimately took up the anti-
reform mantle (Roberts, 2013, p. 1440). In Latin America, 
import substitution industrialization (ISI) gave rise to a 
strong organized labor sector that helped structure the party 
system (Roberts, 2013). Even if new political parties had to 
emerge to channel antieconomic reform sentiment in Latin 
American countries, the new party that emerged to fill the 
gap could potentially count on the support of a large voting 
bloc in the future. Indeed, although Roberts (2013, p. 1447) 
notes the inchoate nature of political party competition in 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, countries that saw their 
party systems completely destabilized by economic reform, 
he acknowledges the potential for these systems to stabilize 
in the future. In his words:
. . . the new, anti-neoliberal leftist alternatives in countries such 
as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia have revived programmatic 
contestation in national political systems. As such, they may 
eventually provide a foundation for the reconfiguration of 
party systems around a central ideological and programmatic 
cleavage.
In Africa, existing opposition parties have generally not pro-
vided a credible vehicle for those upset with structural adjust-
ment to channel their sentiments. Overall, political parties in 
Africa are much younger and less institutionalized than those 
in Latin America (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2001), and the oppo-
sition in most countries is weak (Bleck & van de Walle, 
2019; Rakner & van de Walle, 2009). Organized labor is 
weak in Africa (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997) and therefore 
has not helped structure the party system. Thus, fewer parties 
have established consistent reputations for policy stances. In 
fact, position taking is rare among parties in African coun-
tries (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019), where political support is 
largely obtained and sustained through clientelism and the 
distribution of state resources (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; 
Englebert & Dunn, 2019). Also, as Resnick (2014, p. 59) 
notes, Africa has more electoral coalitions than one would 
expect, given the prevalence of presidential executive sys-
tems in the region. In the case of coalitions involving the 
incumbent parties, opposition parties that have participated 
in governments that agree to adjustment would be tainted 
with the decisions of the governing parties. In countries such 
as these, the opposition parties would not be credible vehi-
cles for expressing opposition to structural adjustment. As 
most political parties in Africa are not programmatic, a new 
party able to capture the support of those upset with the rul-
ing party for entering structural adjustment agreements 
would have a harder time maintaining a stable constituency 
to support it into the future. Therefore, extra-system volatil-
ity is more likely to occur in the future elections in the politi-
cal systems of Africa than those of Latin America. In short, 
we have reason to expect that structural adjustment will be 
associated with within-system in Latin America, notwith-
standing the findings of Kuenzi et al. (2019) concerning 
adjustment’s positive effect on extra-system volatility in 
Africa.
The Role of Other Factors
Institutions. Institutional arrangements are also thought 
to play a role in legislative volatility. The electoral system 
could influence the level of legislative volatility and there-
fore we examine the effects of using a plurality electoral 
system to elect at least some legislators on volatility. Based 
on Duverger’s propositions and the work of many others, a 
plurality single-member district (SMD) system tends to cre-
ate significant barriers to the entry of new parties into the 
electoral arena and militate against the existence of small 
parties. As Andrews and Bairett (2014, pp. 310–311) note, 
Cox (1997) theorizes that such conditions encourage politi-
cal elites to coordinate. We would therefore generally expect 
countries that use plurality SMD systems to elect even 
some of the legislators in the upper house or lower house to 
have lower levels of electoral volatility, on average. Since 
extra-system volatility is created by the entry of new parties 
into the political arena, we would expect this effect to be 
strongest on extra-system volatility. Some research fails to 
find, however, that the electoral system influences electoral 
volatility in post-Communist countries (Powell & Tucker, 
2014) and Africa (Bogaards, 2008; Ferree, 2010; Mozaffar 
& Scarritt, 2005). Moreover, Kuenzi et al. (2019) and Weg-
horst and Bernhard (2014) report a significant negative rela-
tionship between district magnitude and volatility in African 
countries. Weghorst and Bernhard (2014, p. 1724) invoke 
Tavits’ (2005) explanation for this relationship as she also 
finds a negative relationship between district magnitude 
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and volatility. According to Tavits (2005, p. 292), in the con-
text of new democracies where voter loyalty may be low and 
political party platforms may not be easily distinguishable, 
voters are able to select among numerous parties in more 
permissive political party systems. Therefore, when voters 
are unhappy with the party they supported previously, a large 
group of such voters is less likely to redirect its support to a 
new party.
If the situation in Latin America matches Tavits’ (2005) 
description, we would expect a negative relationship between 
party fractionalization and electoral volatility. It is worth not-
ing, however, that the conventional wisdom has been that the 
level of party fragmentation is positively associated with 
electoral volatility. The logic behind this hypothesized rela-
tionship is straightforward. Drawing on Pedersen’s (1983) 
description of the relationship between party fragmentation 
and electoral volatility, Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) explain 
that, as more and more political parties enter the political 
arena, parties tend to be closer in terms of ideology and pro-
grammatic commitments than they do when there are only a 
few parties. Under these conditions, voters are more likely to 
be able to choose among several parties that represent their 
preferences and therefore have a greater propensity to change 
their vote choices from election to election (161–2).
Whether presidential and legislative elections are held 
concurrently may also influence electoral volatility in Latin 
America. Andrews and Bairett (2014, p. 311) expand on 
Cox’s (1997) logic that as more elections are held simultane-
ously, party leaders will have a greater incentive to coordi-
nate their activities. This coordination ultimately results in 
fewer parties. Andrews and Bairett (2014, p. 311) hypothe-
size that the coordination that is likely to accompany concur-
rently held legislative and presidential elections will also 
result in less electoral volatility. The results of their study of 
Central and European democracies support this hypothesis. 
We also test the effects of concurrent elections on volatility; 
to our knowledge, this has not been done in the context of 
Latin America.
In addition, we would expect the quality of democracy to 
be related to electoral volatility. Based on the literature, in a 
healthy democracy, we would expect to see shifts in support 
among existing parties based on how citizens evaluate the 
performance of these parties when they are in office. On the 
contrary, high extra-system volatility may indicate that polit-
ical parties are not effectively representing and building rela-
tionships with the people leading to frequent party entry into 
and party exit from the political arena. We would therefore 
expect there to be a positive relationship between democracy 
and within-system volatility while we expect there to be a 
negative relationship between democracy and extra-system 
volatility.
Social Demography. Beyond institutional factors, we might 
also expect the social demography of a country to affect elec-
toral volatility. Based on the experience of Western Europe, 
Birnir (2007) contends that ethnic voting could potentially 
stabilize party systems in new democracies. On the con-
trary, given the shifts that can occur in the ethnic alliances 
encompassed in parties, we might expect that more ethnic 
diversity would lead to more volatility. Some studies of post-
Communist Europe fail to find a relationship between ethnic 
divisions and volatility (Bernhard & Karakoc, 2011; Pow-
ell & Tucker, 2014; Tavits, 2005), but other studies find that 
the ethnic composition of the population influences volatil-
ity in Africa (Ferree, 2010; Kuenzi et al., 2019; Weghorst & 
Bernhard, 2014), and it would appear that the tendency of 
multiethnic coalitions to fall apart over time boosts volatility 
(Ferree, 2010). In addition, Madrid (2005) finds a positive 
relationship between the relative size of the indigenous pop-
ulation and electoral volatility in Latin American countries. 
He attributes this relationship to the new parties that emerged 
to represent the interests of indigenous groups, which had 
previously been neglected by the established parties. Given 
these findings, we hypothesize that higher levels of ethnic 
diversity will be associated with higher levels of electoral 
volatility in Latin America. On a related note, countries with 
large populations are less likely to be cohesive. We would 
therefore expect a positive relationship between the size of a 
country’s population and electoral volatility.
Data and Methods
Our analysis focuses on the lower chamber legislative elec-
tions in 18 Latin American countries for the period of 1982 
to 2016. During the study period, Latin America went 
through a tumultuous period including the 1982 debt crisis, 
economic reforms, and regime changes (Smith, 2013; Tuman 
et al., 2001). In addition, during this period, the IMF made 
agreements with numerous Latin American countries which 
required governments to adhere to policy prescriptions and 
conditionalities established by the Fund (Pop-Eleches, 2009). 
This coincided with a great increase in electoral volatility in 
the region between the 1980s and 1990s (Cohen et al., 2018). 
As such, the time-series for the study is appropriate to test 
our hypotheses.
As there is a variation in how frequently countries in the 
region hold elections, the panels are unbalanced (i.e., the 
number of year observations for each panel are not uniform). 
For example, Argentina holds parliamentary elections every 
other year, while in Chile, they are held every 4 years. 
Furthermore, some countries appear more often in the data 
set due to their earlier transition to democracy. On average, 
each country in the study held 8.16 elections. (Table A2 in 
the Appendix displays the countries of study and the number 
of observed elections per country.)
The dependent variables measuring electoral volatility are 
gathered from the LAPALE data set. The LAPALE data set 
(Cohen et al., 2018) has been subjected to peer review and 
published in a highly selective outlet, the Journal of Politics. 
The data set provides transparent coding rules for cases, and, 
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to the best of our knowledge, there are no published critiques 
of the accuracy of the data. An advantage of using the 
LAPALE data set is that it provides information for extra-
system volatility, within-system volatility, and total volatility 
between consecutive elections measured in terms of vote 
share. Theoretically, the measurement for each type of vola-
tility can range from no change between elections (0) to full-
scale change (100). There are considerable variations among 
countries in Latin America when it comes to electoral volatil-
ity. In countries such as Chile and Honduras, the average 
total volatility is less than 20% compared to Guatemala and 
Peru where it is more than 50%. Similarly, there are differ-
ences among countries with regard to whether extra-system 
volatility or within-system volatility are more prevalent 
which illustrates the importance of testing for the influences 
of the covariates on the different types of volatility.
We evaluate the influences of countries under IMF adjust-
ment programs by constructing a binary variable in which 
countries were coded as “1” if they had received an adjust-
ment disbursement from the Fund in that particular year, and 
“0” otherwise. The covariate was constructed using informa-
tion from the website of the International Monetary Fund 
(various years), and it was lagged by 1 year. We expect that 
the effects of IMF programs on voters’ judgments will be 
lagged, as the influence of conditionality gradually becomes 
evident (see Kuenzi et al., 2019). Furthermore, the 1-year lag 
structure in the IMF measure reduces possible endogeneity 
between IMF disbursement and electoral outcomes.
In addition, we include standard measures that test for the 
potential impact of economic factors on electoral volatility, 
including the log of GDP per capita and the percent change 
in GDP per capita. The information for the economic indica-
tors is gathered from the World Bank (various years), trans-
formed into 2010 constant dollars and lagged by 1 year. 
(Table A3 in the Appendix shows the countries and years that 
are coded as having an IMF disbursement.)
Two dichotomous institutional covariates are included to 
indicate whether a country uses a plurality system or not to 
elect at least some of the legislators and if it holds concurrent 
presidential and legislative elections. Polity IV scores, lagged 
by 1 year, are used to control for a country’s level of democ-
racy. In addition, we include a variable to account for how 
long a country has had multiparty elections. Our measure of 
experience with multiparty elections, which is named age of 
democracy, is based on Cohen et al.’s (2018) data. We also 
performed the analysis including a measure of age of democ-
racy that included the election prior to the first election listed 
in Cohen et al.’s (2018) data set and the results were essen-
tially the same. A variable measuring the fractionalization of 
the party system lagged from the previous election is also 
included (data are from the LAPALE data set). Furthermore, 
we control for countries’ level of ethnic diversity (data are 
from Alesina & et al, 2003) and population size. The log of 
population, lagged by 1 year, was obtained from the World 
Bank (various years). The descriptive statistics for the 
variables are provided in Table 1, and more details on the 
measures and sources for each independent variable are pro-
vided in the Appendix in Table A1.
As noted, the data set includes observations for 18 coun-
tries for the study period (36 years). Thus, the data set may 
be described as time-series cross-section. Initial tests sug-
gested that heteroscedasticity in the errors is present in the 
data (Breusch-Pagan and Cook-Weisberg test for heteroske-
dasticity, p<.001 for all models). To adjust for heterosce-
dasticity, we estimate the models with pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression with panel-corrected standard 
errors (Beck & Katz, 1995). The ratio of year-to-country 
observations is more than adequate for panel correction of 
the standard errors. However, we also estimated all models 
with pooled OLS and Driscoll–Kraay standard errors to 
address concerns about finite sample issues (see Hoechle, 
2007, p. 5). The results of these trials were completely 
consistent with the estimates with pooled OLS with panel-
corrected standard errors.
The data on elections and volatility have gaps across 
years, and, as such, one might expect that the degree of auto-
correlation in the errors might be lower. Additional analysis 
indicated that the pooled autocorrelation parameter, rho, was 
.09 or smaller for within-system, extra-system, or total vola-
tility, suggesting that serial correlation of the errors is low 
and not compromising our results. For this reason, the speci-
fications do not include any corrections for autocorrelation.
Alternative trials with a fixed-effects estimation (with 
dummy variables for all years and countries) proved to be 
unviable due to excessively high levels of multicollinearity 
between some substantive covariates and country dummy 
variables. Indeed, in the fixed-effects trial, the variance infla-
tion factor (VIF) scores for the log of population and log of 
GDP per capita were 997 and 122, respectively, while nine 
country variables exhibited VIF scores ranging from more 
than 300 to 600 (with a mean VIF score of 125 for all equa-
tions). This suggests that the level of collinearity for fixed-
effects regression is well beyond tolerance. However, it 
should be noted that for our models, which are estimated 
with pooled OLS, the level of collinearity was within toler-
ance (maximum VIF score of 1.92 for the log of population, 
while all other covariates were lower; and a mean VIF of 
1.36 or lower for all equations).
In addition, the pattern of the residual variance ratios for 
each country was compact and exhibited a fairly uniform 
pattern indicating that a fixed-effects regression model 
would be mis-specified (see Stimson, 1985). The summed 
residuals and residual variance ratios for each country (unit) 
were not large (less than two times the mean of the depen-
dent variable), which suggests that the model results are not 
driven by a subset of countries in the data set. Still, to address 
concerns raised by one reviewer, we omitted Mexico as a 
potentially influential unit and re-estimated the equations 
for Models 1 to 3. In these trials, the results for the IMF 
adjustment covariate were completely consistent with the 
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original models, and results for other covariates did not 
change.
Results
Does structural adjustment stimulate electoral volatility in 
Latin America? Table 2 presents the results for models of 
within-system volatility, extra-system volatility, and total 
volatility. As can be seen in Model 1, Table 2, our hypothesis 
that structural adjustment increases within-system volatility 
is borne out in the results for within-system volatility. The 
coefficient for structural adjustment is positive and signifi-
cant (p <.01) in the model for within-system volatility 
(Model 1), indicating that vote shares among existing parties 
are likely to be less stable in countries undergoing structural 
adjustment. The coefficient for structural adjustment fails to 
gain significance in the models for extra-system and total 
volatility (Models 2 to 3). These findings are consistent with 
our expectations. Structural adjustment is a highly visible 
issue in the context of Latin America and Africa and has been 
found to motivate protesting in both regions. As noted, in the 
case of African countries, Kuenzi et al. (2019) also find that 
structural adjustment boosts electoral volatility, yet their 
findings suggest that it does so primarily be increasing extra-
system volatility. We argue that the divergent pattern in Latin 
America is due to the supply of established opposition par-
ties, on average, that have been able to articulate voters’ dis-
content with reforms. By contrast, voters may be more open 
to appeals from new parties that promise to undo IMF-
backed programs in Africa, where opposition parties are 
generally weak (Rakner & van de Walle, 2009) and nonpro-
grammatic. Moreover, although there is a great deal of vari-
ation in the level of party system institutionalization across 
countries in both Africa and Latin America, as noted, the 
party systems of Latin America tend to be older and more 
institutionalized than those of Africa (Kuenzi & Lambright, 
2001, pp. 462–463). Taken together, these results suggest 
that incumbent parties will be punished at the polls for 
entering into structural adjustment agreements. Our results 
support the contention that whether disillusioned voters 
decide to put their support behind a new party or one that 
already exists depends on the conditions in the regional con-
text. More specifically, when existing opposition parties pro-
vide a credible vehicle for channeling the sentiments of 
voters dissatisfied with the government, as opposition parties 
have in numerous Latin American countries, those dissatis-
fied voters will transfer their support to an established oppo-
sition party, giving rise to within-system volatility.
Of course, another international factor—foreign aid 
flows—might also have an effect in reducing different types 
of electoral volatility in Latin America. In separate trials, we 
estimated Models 1 to 3 with the log of bilateral aid per cap-
ita (in constant 2010 dollars, and lagged 1 year) to each 
country from all donors in the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development 
Assistance Committee. The coefficient for lagged aid was 
insignificant, while results for the models were consistent. 
Although bilateral aid has been shown to reduce volatility in 
Africa (Kuenzi et al., 2019), it has less effect in Latin America 
because it comprises a much smaller share of government 
budgets and spending, on average, in the region. For this rea-
son, bilateral aid flows have less influence on the electoral 
fortunes of ruling parties in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The coefficient for economic growth, a standard indica-
tor of economic performance, is not significant. Economic 
growth therefore does not appear to affect legislative vola-
tility. This finding together with the finding that structural 
adjustment tends to elevate within-system volatility high-
light the importance of identifying the economic issues 
likely to be prominent in the context of study. Wealthy 
countries appear to have less extra-system volatility and 
total volatility than their less-wealthy counterparts. This 
result is not surprising because GDP per capita has been 
used in some studies as an indicator of government capacity 
(e.g., see Fearon & Laitin, 2003), a concept closely linked 
to institutionalization.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Total volatility 147 .378 .24 .042 1
Type A 147 .237 .234 0 1
Type B 147 .143 .078 0 .391
IMF disbursement, lag 147 .265 .443 0 1
Party fractionalization, lag 147 .265 .119 .064 .597
Plurality system 147 .476 .501 0 1
Concurrent elections 147 .721 .445 0 1
Democracy, lag 147 7.24 2.68 −8 10
Ethnic diversity 147 .429 .186 .169 .74
Population, log 147 2.71 1.14 .862 5.31
GDP per capita (log, t−1) 147 8.46 .652 7.02 9.55
GDP growth, lag 147 3.55 3.90 −13.38 18.29
Age of democracy 147 14.7 9.28 0 34
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Beyond economic influences, what do the models suggest 
about institutional and sociodemographic factors? The 
results displayed in Table 2 suggest that party fractionaliza-
tion generally depresses within-system volatility and overall 
electoral volatility. This finding is consistent with Tavits’ 
(2005) logic that a larger number of parties from which citi-
zens can select may reduce large-scale shifts in citizen sup-
port from one party to another. The coefficient for party 
fractionalization is, however, negative but not significant in 
the model of extra-system volatility. The fragmentation of 
the political party system would therefore not seem to have 
any effect on whether new parties successfully enter the elec-
toral arena.
As one can see in Table 2, consistent with expectations, 
the coefficient for plurality systems is negative and signifi-
cant in the model of extra-system volatility (Model 2). This 
type of electoral system erects significant barriers to entering 
the political arena. Therefore, using this electoral system to 
elect even some of the legislators tends to depress extra-sys-
tem volatility. The coefficient for plurality is also negative 
and significant in the model for total volatility. Although the 
coefficient for plurality is negative for within-system volatil-
ity, it is not significant. This finding has implications for 
potential ways to address extra-system volatility. Allocating 
some of the legislative seats through the plurality formula 
would appear to encourage coordination among political 
actors and depress extra-system volatility.
The concurrency of presidential and legislative elections 
would appear to influence both within-system volatility and 
extra-system volatility, but in opposite ways. As theorized in 
the literature, holding concurrent presidential and legislative 
elections mitigates within-system volatility as party leaders 
have a strong motivation to coordinate, and people tend to 
like to vote for the same party for the both the legislative 
seat(s) and presidential office. Indeed, the coefficient for 
concurrency is negative and significant in the model for 
within-system volatility, albeit at the .1 level. In contrast, as 
demonstrated in Table 2, the coefficient for concurrency is 
positive and highly significant in the model of extra-system 
volatility. Although this result may initially seem surprising, 
there is a logic to the finding. If a political outsider who is 
relatively popular contests a presidential election, s/he is 
likely to create a new party as her or his political vehicle. 
Those supporting the political outsider for the presidential 
election may also transfer support to the new outsider party 
in the legislative election. Within the recent history of Latin 
America, there are numerous examples of this phenome-
non. For example, when Alberto Fujimori first emerged as 
a right-wing populist presidential candidate in Peru’s 1990 
election, he formed a new party, Cambio 90, which gar-
nered 16.5% of legislative seats when he was elected 
(Roberts, 2006, pp. 93–94). Similarly, in Venezuela, Hugo 
Chávez’s left-wing candidacy was accompanied by the for-
mation of the Movimiento V. República (MVR) (Ellner, 
Table 2. Determinants of Electoral Volatility in Latin America.
Variables Model 1—within-system volatility Model 2—extra-system volatility Model 3—total volatility






Plurality system −0.0121 −0.127*** −0.139***
(0.0141) (0.0283) (0.0300)
Concurrent elections −0.0257+ 0.0803* 0.0547
(0.0146) (0.0361) (0.0404)
Democracy(t−1) −0.00329 −0.0159* −0.0192**
(0.00257) (0.00759) (0.00746)
Ethnic diversity 0.0469 0.289** 0.336**
(0.0390) (0.118) (0.114)
Population (ln) −0.00857 0.0259+ 0.0173
(0.00598) (0.0144) (0.0156)
GDP per capita(ln, t−1) 0.0143 −0.103*** −0.0886***
(0.0117) (0.0282) (0.0271)




Age of democracy −0.000169 0.00355+ 0.00338+
(0.000658) (0.00196) (0.00193)
Constant 0.110 1.034*** 1.144***
(0.106) (0.279) (0.269)
Observations 147 147 147
Top entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. GDP, gross domestic product.
+p ≤ .10. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.
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2005). MVR won 20% of legislative seats with Chávez in 
the 1998 election (and increased its seat share to 55% in the 
2000 elections following adoption of a new constitution). 
The creation of PAIS in Ecuador (2006), which was a vehicle 
for Rafael Correa’s candidacy, also illustrates this pattern.
Consistent with expectations, ethnic diversity is associ-
ated with higher levels of electoral volatility. The coeffi-
cient for ethnic diversity is positive in the models for 
extra-system and total volatility. The results for this covari-
ate for extra-system volatility are also intuitive. As differ-
ent groups are incorporated into the political system, new 
parties are likely to emerge to represent their interests. This 
pattern has been well-documented with parties and indige-
nous groups in Ecuador, but other cases are also illustrative. 
In Bolivia, the MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) and MIP 
(Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti) parties increasingly rep-
resented members of the Aymara and Quechua after their 
mobilization in the 1990s (Van Cott, 2005, pp. 12, 95–96). 
Van Cott (2005, p. 12, n. 9) also provides examples of par-
ties in Colombia that emerged to incorporate newly active 
Afro-Colombians. Interestingly, ethnic diversity has a 
strong positive effect on within-system volatility in African 
countries but does not have a significant effect on extra-
system volatility (Kuenzi et al., 2019). As noted, ethnic 
diversity appears to be connected to extra-system volatility 
in Latin America because new parties have emerged in 
countries to represent different groups as they become 
incorporated into the system (see Madrid, 2005). In Africa, 
the most ethnically diverse region of the world, ethnic 
diversity appears to be linked to within-system volatility 
not because of the incorporation of new groups that require 
new parties to represent them but because ethnic coalitions 
tend to be unstable (Ferree, 2010) resulting in shifting alli-
ances. The coefficient for the log of the population is posi-
tive, as expected, but is only significant at the 0.1 level in 
the model for extra-system volatility (Model 2). It appears 
that it is the level of diversity of the population rather than 
the population size that affects electoral volatility.
The level of democracy appears to have a mitigating 
effect on extra-system volatility and total volatility, as the 
coefficients for these variables are negative and significant. 
The coefficient for democracy is negative but not significant 
in the model for within-system volatility. This finding is con-
sistent with the argument that extra-system volatility and 
democratic strength are negatively associated with each 
other. Where democracy is strong, we would expect estab-
lished parties to be available to articulate the sentiments of 
the citizens. In contrast, the coefficient for the age of the 
democratic regime is positive and significant at the .1 level in 
the models for extra-system volatility and total volatility, 
suggesting that a longer experience with multiparty elections 
is associated with higher levels of extra-system volatility and 
total volatility. At first, this result may seem surprising, but it 
makes a great deal of sense, given the trends toward the 
greater incorporation of different groups we have seen over 
time in the political systems of Latin American countries, 
which we discuss above. This finding is consistent with those 
of many other studies which do not find that party systems 
stabilize over time (e.g., see Bernhard & Karakoc, 2011; 
Bogaards, 2008; Lindberg, 2007; Mainwaring & Zoco, 
2007). Although the length of time a country has had experi-
ence with multiparty elections does not appear to be related 
extra-system volatility in the way one would expect, the 
level of democracy does have a dampening effect on the 
level of extra-system volatility. Thus, it does not appear to 
be the length of time a country has been a democracy but 
rather the quality of democracy that depresses the likeli-
hood of new parties entering the political arena and attract-
ing support.
Conclusion
This study supports a broad version of the economic voting 
theory and suggests that the political economy variables 
that influence voting behavior and by extension electoral 
volatility are likely to differ across contexts, depending on 
which economic issues are salient to the public. Indeed, our 
results do not indicate that there is a straightforward rela-
tionship between economic downturns and electoral vola-
tility in Latin American countries as economic growth does 
not register a significant relationship with electoral volatil-
ity. We add to the prior literature by demonstrating that 
structural adjustment increases legislative volatility in Latin 
America, where neoliberal reforms have been a salient issue. 
Given that structural adjustment also increases legislative 
volatility in Africa’s multiparty electoral regimes, it seems 
reasonable to hypothesize that structural adjustment will 
contribute to volatility in those countries where it has been a 
prominent issue. Therefore, we are helping to refine the 
economic voting theory as it applies to transitional democ-
racies. Moreover, the results of our study lend support to 
the notion that whether voters punish ruling parties for poor 
performance by shifting their votes to established opposi-
tion parties or new parties depends on a country’s supply of 
parties.
Our findings also highlight the importance of disaggre-
gating electoral volatility when attempting to identify the 
factors behind it. Within-system volatility and extra-system 
volatility appear to be largely driven by different factors, or 
in different ways by the same factors in Latin American 
countries. For example, the concurrency of presidential and 
legislative elections tends to depress within-system volatility 
but raise extra-system volatility. Therefore, when one exam-
ines only total volatility, one is likely to miss important rela-
tionships. Extra-system volatility appears to be driven by the 
institutional arrangements and social demography of a coun-
try. Electoral systems that encourage political leaders to 
coordinate appear to have a mitigating effect on extra-system 
volatility. Higher levels of extra-system volatility tend to 
characterize countries with lower levels of democracy and 
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larger, more ethnically diverse populations. Just as Powell 
and Tucker (2014) find that identifying factors that influence 
within-system volatility is the more difficult task in post-
Communist Europe, we find that only a couple of variables 
included in our models affect within-system volatility in 
Latin America. Given the small number of factors that appear 
to influence within-system volatility in Latin America, the 
effect of structural adjustment on this type of volatility is all 
the more striking.
The findings of this study are also limited in certain 
respects. First, the time-series for the analysis covers the 
period of 1982 to 2016. Although this time frame is appropri-
ate to test the main covariates of interest, it is possible that a 
longer time-series would yield different results. Second, as 
noted, the underlying reasons for the contrasting effects of 
adjustment on electoral volatility in Africa and Latin America 
remain unclear. We remain hopeful that future researchers 
will address these issues in their work.
Table A1. Independent Variables, Measures, and Sources.
Variable Measure Source(s)
IMF Program(t−1) Coded “1” if a country received disbursement 
from the IMF in the previous year, “0” 
otherwise. Lagged by 1 year.
IMF website, https://www.imf.org/external/index.htm
Party fractionalization(t−1) Calculated by squaring the share of the parties in 
an election and adding all the squares together, 
lagged by 1 year
LAPALE data set (Cohen et al., 2018)
Plurality system Coded “1” if at least some of the legislators were 
elected using plurality electoral rules in either 
the upper house or lower house, “0” otherwise.
World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions 
(Keefer 2012), https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/
dataset/wps2283-database-political-institutions
Concurrent elections Coded “1” if legislative and presidential elections 
were held concurrently, “0” otherwise.
LAPALE data set (Cohen et al., 2018)
Democracy(t−1) Polity IV scores, lagged by 1 year Marshall et al. (2017)
Ethnic diversity Level of ethnic diversity Alesina et al. (2003)
Population, log Log of population World Bank Development Indicators (n.d.)
GDP per capita (log, t−1) Log of GDP per capita in constant 2010 USD, 
lagged by 1 year
World Bank Development Indicators (n.d.)
GDP growth(t−1) GDP growth in constant 2010 USD, lagged by 1 
year
World Bank Development Indicators (n.d.)
Age of democracy Years since first election in data set LAPALE data set (Cohen et al., 2018)
Table A2. List of Countries in Study and the Number of 





















Table A3. Countries and Years Receiving IMF  
Disbursement.
Country Year
Argentina 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
 2001 2005  
Bolivia 1989 1993 1997 2002 2005  
Brazil 2002  
Costa Rica 1986  
Dominican 
Republic
1986 1994 2006 2010  
Ecuador 1986 1988 1990 1992 2002 2017
Honduras 1993 2001 2005  
Mexico 1985 1988 1991 2000  
Nicaragua 2001 2011  
Panama 1994 1999  
Peru 1985  
Uruguay 1999 2004  
Note: No observations for Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Paraguay, and Venezuela.
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